Abstract. In this paper the block cipher RC6 is analysed. RC6 is submitted as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard, and is one of five finalists. It has 128-bit blocks and supports keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits, and is an iterated 20-round block cipher. Here it is shown that versions of RC6 with 128-bit blocks can be distinguished from a random permutation with up to 15 rounds; for some weak keys up to 17 rounds. Moreover, with an increased effort key-recovery attacks faster than exhaustive key search can be mounted on RC6 with up to 12 rounds for 128 bit keys, on 14 rounds for 192 bit keys and on 15 rounds for 256 bit keys.
Introduction
RC6 is a candidate block cipher submitted to NIST for consideration as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). RC6 (see [12] ) is an evolutionary development of RC5. Like RC5, RC6 makes essential use of data-dependent rotations. New features of RC6 include the use of four working registers instead of two, and the inclusion of integer multiplication as an additional primitive operation. RC6 is a parameterized family of encryption algorithms, where RC6-w/r/b is the version with word size w in bits, with r rounds and with an encryption key of b bytes.
The AES submission is the version with w = 32, r = 20, and RC6 is a shorthand notation for this version, whereby the key length can be b = 16, 24, and 32 bytes, respectively. In [4, 5] the security of RC6 has been evaluated with respect to differential and linear cryptanalysis. It was concluded that RC6 is secure with respect to differential cryptanalysis for 12 or more rounds. For linear cryptanalysis, some variants are considered in [4] . It was found that a two-round iterative linear approximation leads to the most effective basic linear attack applicable up to 13 rounds. However, no specific method for key-recovery was given. Furthermore, in [4] some potential enhancements of linear attacks using multiple approximations and linear hulls are sketched, and it is estimated that 16 rounds of RC6 can be attacked using about 2 119 known plaintexts. These additional considerations on linear cryptanalysis were used to set a suitable number of rounds for RC6 to be r = 20. In this paper we investigate two-round iterations which are quite different from those considered in [4] . Instead of tracing bitwise linear approximations, we consider input-output dependencies by fixing the least significant five bits in the first and third words of the input block. The correlations of the corresponding two 5-bit integer values at the output are caused by specific rotation amounts in the data dependent rotations and can be effectively measured by χ 2 tests. As confirmed by extensive experiments, this leads to an efficient statistical analysis which considerably improves over the basic linear attack. Estimates of the complexity of our analysis imply that reduced round versions of RC6 with up to 15 rounds are not random.
The linear attacks in [4] deal with correlations between input and output bits, but they do not involve key bits, whereas our statistical analysis can be used to develop a method to find all round subkeys. This attack is faster than an exhautive key search for the 128-bit version of RC6 with up to 12 rounds, and for the 192-bit and 256-bit versions of RC6 with up to 14 and 15 rounds.
After completion of the first report of this work [9] , our attention was drawn to an earlier result by Baudron et al in [1] where an attack similar to ours is outlined. (See also [6] .) These results have since been written up in [2] .
In the following we briefly recall the description of RC6, see Figure 1 . For a detailed description we refer to [12] . The user-key has length b bytes and the 4w-bit plaintext block is loaded into words A, B, C, D. These four w-bit words also contain the ciphertext at the end. The key-schedule (see [12] ) expands the user-key into subkeys S[0], S [1] , ..., S[2r + 3] . In our considerations we shall not make use of the detailed description of the key-schedule, but we assume the subkeys to be uniformly random. To describe the encryption algorithm the following notation is used: (A, B, C, D) = (B, C, D, A) means the parallel assignment of values on the right to registers on the left. Moreover, a × b denotes integer multiplication modulo 2 w , a << lg w means fixed rotation of the w-bit word a by lg w, the base-two logarithm of w, and a << b denotes rotation of a to the left by the amount given by the least significant lg w bits of b. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we review χ 2 tests as a useful tool to detect nonuniformness in probability distributions. In Section 3 the relationship between small rotation amounts and correlation in RC6 is investigated and a class of weak keys is identified. In Section 4 distinguishing and key-recovery attacks are developed, and in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
χ Tests
In this section we recall how to distinguish a random source with unknown probability distribution p X from a random source with uniform distribution p U . A common tool for this task is the χ 2 test, which is briefly recalled together with some useful facts (see e.g., [7] , [8] , [10] , [13] ). We shall later use χ 2 tests to detect correlation between specific input and output subblocks of r-round RC6.
Let X = X 0 , X 1 , ..., X n−1 be independent and identically distributed random variables taking values in the set {a 0 , a 1 , ..., a m−1 } with unknown probability distribution. Then the χ 2 test is used to decide if an observation X 0 , X 1 , ..., X n−1 is consistent with the hypothesis P r{X = a j } = p(j) for 0 ≤ j < m, where p X = {p(j)} is a (discrete) probability distribution on a set of m elements. Let N aj (X) denote the number of times the observation X takes on the value a j . Then obviously i N aj (X) = n. The χ 2 statistic is the random variable defined by
For the uniform distribution p U , the χ 2 statistic is just m/n i (N aj (X)−n/m) 2 . In a χ 2 test, the observed χ 2 statistic is compared to χ 2 a,m−1 , the threshold for the χ 2 test with m − 1 degrees of freedom and with significance level a. In our investigation of RC6, we shall specifically need the threshold values for 1023 degrees of freedom, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 . For example, the entry 1131 for 0.99 in Table 1 says that the expression m/n i (N aj (X) − n/m) 2 for large n will exceed 1131 only in 1% of the time, provided the underlying distribution of the observation X is indeed uniform. For practical experiments the question arises how large the size n of the observation should be in order to detect that a distribution p X is nonuniform. In order to estimate n, consider the bias of a probability distribution p X defined by the 
From [7] we quote the expected value of the χ 2 statistic (1) of a distribution p X , as well as some useful conclusions:
For the case of the uniform distribution this implies
. As a conclusion, the size n = c/||p X − p U || of the observation suffices to distinguish a source with distribution p X from a source with uniform distribution. Clearly, the constant c needs to be larger for higher significance level a.
Correlations in RC6
In [4] , under the title of Type I Approximations, a two-round linear approximation has been studied which is based on small rotation amounts in the data dependent rotations. This linear approximation is described by (A·e t )⊕(C ·e s ) = (A · e u ) ⊕ (C · e v ). Here A and C are the first and third words of some intermediate data, A and C are the first and third words of the intermediate data after a further two rounds of encryption in RC6, and e t denotes the 32-bit word with a single one in the t th least significant bit position. It has been noticed that for t = s = u = v = 0 the case where both rotation amounts are zero in the first of the two rounds leads to a bias of 2 −11 . This is derived by using the piling-up lemma and the fact that the second and fourth words remain unchanged in the second round. If t, s, u, v are nonzero but less than 5, there is a smaller bias, which depends on the values of t, s, u, v. Note that no key bits are involved in the approximation.
In our approach we do not consider the XOR of single bits in the first and third words. Instead we fix each of the least significant five bits in words A and C of the input and investigate the statistics of the 10-bit integer obtained by concatenating each of the least significant five bits in words A and C every two rounds later. This is motivated by the fact that the least significant five bits in A and C altogether are not changed by the xor and data dependent rotation if both rotation amounts are zero. More generally, we can expect a bias for amounts smaller than five. As we shall demonstrate, this leads to much stronger biases which can be iterated over many rounds, just as linear approximations. In this way we can consider small rotation amounts as a single event, in which amounts near zero from the negative, like 30 or 31, prove to be useful as well.
Small Rotation Amounts
To see the effect of small rotation amounts on the values of the least significant five bits in the first and third words in RC6, we implemented the following tests with 4 rounds:
Let us denote by (a, b) the two amounts in the data dependent rotations in the first round. To measure the effect on the distribution of the target bits, we forced the values of a and b by taking appropriate plaintexts and we computed the χ 2 -value of the 10-bit integers after 4 rounds. For each experiment we took 2 18 texts to get a big χ 2 -value to clearly measure the effect. By the symmetry in the design of RC6, it can be expected that (a, b) gives the same χ 2 -value as (b, a). We observe that the χ 2 -values for all pairs (a, b) with |a| < 5 and |b| < 5 are significantly higher than the expected value 1023 for uniform 10-bit integers. Note that these tests suggest that we get similar χ 2 -values for constant values of the "distance" |a − 32| + |b − 32| ( mod 32): The pairs (0,31) and (0,1) both have distance 1 and similar χ 2 -values, and the pairs (1,1),(0,2), (31,31), and (0,30) all have distance 2 and have similar χ 2 -values. Let us take a closer look at how the above observations lead to a nonuniform distribution. Assume that the least significant five bits of plaintext words A and C are fixed, e.g., to zero bits. Let us denote by X the concatenation of the least significant five bits of the ciphertext words A and C after two rounds of encryption. In this example, for illustration, we will ignore the addition of the subkeys in the output transformation, and also we will assume that the least significant five bits of both round keys S [2] and S [3] are zero. Denote by t 5 and u 5 the least significant five bits of t and u, see Figure 1 . Then in the first round, if t 5 = u 5 = 0, then X will be zero. Since the function f is a permutation, t 5 and u 5 will be zero with a probability of 2 −5 each. If we assume that for |t 5 | ≥ 5 and |u 5 | ≥ 5, the values of X are distributed uniformly at random, the probability that X is zero is at least 2 −10 +(23/32·1/32) It has been clearly demonstrated that the distribution of X is nonuniform. Note that although it was assumed that the involved subkey bits were zero, it follows easily that the nonuniformity remains when these key bits are randomly chosen.
χ 2 Statistic of RC6
Here, we investigate the nonrandomness of r-round versions of RC6. This analysis is based on systematic experiments on increasing numbers of rounds of RC6 with varying word length w. Our method is used to demonstrate that detecting and quantifying nonrandomness is experimentally feasible up to 6 rounds of RC6. For this purpose, the least significant lg w bits in words A and C of the input are fixed to zero. Depending on the experiment and the number of rounds, the remaining input bits are either chosen randomly, or more of the remaining input bits are suitably fixed so that one (or both) of the data dependent rotations are zero. In our tests, we persue the χ 2 statistic of the integer of size twice lg w bits as obtained by concatenating the least significant lg w bits in words A and C every two rounds later.
In the experiments, we consider versions of RC6 with word size w = 8, 16 and 32 bits, respectively (w = 32 corresponding to the AES candidate RC6). It is instructive to see that the general behaviour of the χ 2 test for increasing numbers of rounds in all three cases is very similar. To judge the outcome of these χ 2 tests note that for the word sizes w as considered, 6-bit, 8-bit and 10-bit integers are tested at the output. Hence the numbers of freedom are 63, 255 and 1023 respectively, and these numbers coincide with the expected value of the χ 2 statistic, provided the distribution to be tested is uniform. Subsequently we discuss the results of implemented tests in more detail, where the keys are chosen at random. Table 5 . Here the expected value of the χ 2 statistic is 255. Again a substantial increase is observed in the mean for χ 2 -values if the number of texts is doubled. We notice that passing from 2 to 4 to 6 rounds, the averaged χ 2 -values increase slightly if the corresponding number of plaintexts is increased by a constant factor of 2 13 .
32-bit
128-bit RC6. Consider now r-round versions of RC6 with word size 32 bits, i.e. with round function as in the AES proposal. Table 6 shows the results of implemented tests for r = 2 and r = 4 rounds. Recall that for 10-bit integers the expected value of the χ 2 statistic is 1023, and according to Table 1 the 95% significance level is 1098 and the 99% significance level is 1131. Thus all tests as reported in Table 6 are very unlikely to be produced by uniformly distributed 10-bit integers. In fact for 4 rounds and 2 33 texts almost twice the expected value for a uniform distribution is achieved. Table 7 shows the results of tests with up to 6 rounds but with one or both data dependent rotations in the first round to be fixed to zero. The last entry is the result of a test run on eight processors of a Cray Origin 2000 computer. Both, the experiments in Table 6 and in Table 7 demonstrate that for up to 6 rounds each additional two rounds require roughly 2 16 times as many texts to get about the same χ 2 -value on average. The first two entries of Table 7 again show an increase of the χ 2 -values if the number of texts is doubled. 
A Possible Analytical Explanation
In this subsection we make an attempt to analytically predict the complexities of the χ 2 tests on RC6. In the following, let X be the random variable representing the 10 bits as considered in the ciphertexts after 2 rounds of encryption with RC6 in the tests from the preceding section. Also, let Y and Z be the random variables representing these 10 bits in the ciphertexts after 4 respectively 6 rounds of encryption. It follows from the description of RC6, that the 10 bits in the ciphertexts after six rounds are not the exclusive-or of 10 biased bits from the first two rounds and 10 biased bits from the next two rounds. This is due to the fact that the data-dependent rotations in RC6 are performed after the exclusive-or with the data from the previous rounds. Thus, a parallel to the Piling-Up Lemma used by Matsui [11] does not seem to be applicable.
With the test results of the preceding section and the estimate from Sec. 2, that with n = c/||p X − p U || texts one can expect a χ 2 -value of (c + 1)m, it is possible to compute estimates of ||p X − p U ||, ||p Y − p U ||, and ||p Z − p U ||.
64-bit RC6. The results of the tests in Table 5 yield the following estimates for the distances:
This gives perhaps more convincing evidence, that passing from s to s + 2 rounds in the tests of the preceding section, requires an increase in the texts needed of a factor of a little less than 2 13 . 128-bit RC6. The results of the tests in Table 6 
2 . This confirms the estimate from the preceding section that passing from s to s + 2 rounds in the χ 2 -tests, requires an increase in the texts needed of a factor of a little more than 2
16 . Later, we will use the factor 2 16.2 .
Weak Keys
The test results from the previous sections were given as an average over tests using randomly chosen keys. There was some deviation of the single results, e.g., the χ 2 -values of the tests for RC6 with 128-bit blocks and 4 rounds using 2 33 texts varied from 1731 to 2595 with an average of 2044. Thus, for some keys the deviation is bigger than expected, for other keys it is lower than expected. In this section we report on some weak keys, which perform better than the average key. In Sec. 3.1 it was explained why there is a nonuniform distribution of the 10 target bits, and why for two rounds the involved key bits have no influence on the nonuniformity of the target bits in the χ 2 -tests. However, when iterating the tests to several rounds, the modular additions of round-key bits introduce carry bits which affect the nonuniformity. For 4 rounds, the key bits that may affect the nonuniformity are the five least significant bits of the round keys S [2] and S [3] . When these bits are set to zeros, the χ 2 -value increases. Similarly, for 6 rounds the least significant five bits of the subkeys 2,3,6, and 7 may influence the nonuniformity. This is illustrated by a series of tests, the results of which are shown in Table 8 . For 4 rounds the "distance" to a uniform distribution is about 2 −31.5 which is more than a factor of two higher than for the results averaged over all keys. For 6 rounds the distance to the uniform distribution is about 2 −33.87 for the second test of Table 8 , and about 2 −31.57 for the third test using weak keys. Thus, a factor of more than 4.
Attacks on RC6

Distinguishing Attacks
It is possible to exploit the findings in the previous sections to distinguish RC6 with a certain number of rounds from a permutation randomly chosen from the set of all permutations. In the previous sections we fixed bits in the first and third plaintext words. As we shall see in the next section this makes good sense when implementing key-recovery attacks. In a distinguishing attack it is advantageous to fix the least significant five bits in the second and fourth words instead. It follows that after one round of encryption the least significant five bits in the first and third words of the ciphertext are constant. Table 9 lists the result of tests implemented for RC6 with 128-bit blocks with 3 and 5 rounds. It follows that 2 13.8 texts are sufficient to distinguish the 3-round encryption permutation from a randomly chosen permutation in 90% of the cases. We estimate that for RC6 with 3 + 2r rounds similar results will hold using 2 13.8+r×16.2 texts, which is confirmed by tests implemented on RC6 with 5 rounds.
Note that the χ 2 numbers of Table 9 for 3 rounds are slightly lower than the numbers of Table 6 for 2 rounds. This stems from the fact that in the latter tests, the least significant five bits of the first and third words of the plaintexts were fixed to zeros. In a distinguising attack, one gets the first round "for free", by fixing totally 10 bits of the second and fourth words. However, as these words are added modular 2 32 to subkeys in the input transformation, the least significant five bits of the first and third words in the inputs to the second round are nonzero, but constant, and there is an effect of carry bits by the addition of subkeys after the second-round approximation.
We estimate that for keys where the least significant five bits of each of the two subkeys in every second round are zeros, the attack improves with more than a factor of two for each 2 rounds. This leads to the estimate that for one in 2 80 keys, 17 rounds of RC6 with 128-bit blocks can be distinguished from a randomly chosen permutation. 
Key-Recovery
As confirmed by several experiments, the χ 2 -value is significantly higher if inputs are suitably fixed so that one (or both) of the data dependent rotations in the first round of RC6 are zero. Clearly, the choice of the right input depends on knowledge of the subkey S[0] (or S [1] , respecively). We now describe how the considerations and experimental results of previous sections can be exploited for key recovery. Thereby we restrict to 128-bit RC6 with word size 32 bits.
In the following we will assume that to get similar values in a χ 2 -test on s +2 rounds compared to s rounds requires a factor of 2 16.2 additional plaintexts. Recall that we always fix the least significant five bits in words A and C. In addition suppose we fix inputs so that the data dependent rotation is zero in the first round at word D. Then with a factor of about 2 8.1 less plaintexts we achieve a similar χ 2 -value as for random inputs at word D (e.g. compare row 7 in Table 6 with the first row in Table 7 ). For symmetry reasons, the same holds if inputs at word B are fixed.
With regard to inputs at word D (or B), some comments related to the multiplication in RC6 are in order. The data dependent rotation amounts are determined by the five leading bits of the output of the permutation as given by the multiplication D × (2D + 1) (see Figure 1) . The permutation function restricted to these five output bits is therefore balanced. Rather than fixing inputs we can restrict to inputs leading to these five bits being zero, resulting in more freedom for choosing plaintexts. For efficiency we can prepare a [1] , the data dependent rotations in the first round can be fixed to zero without effort. Thus the χ 2 tests can now be applied by controlling inputs to the second round. This enables finding subkeys S [2] and S [3] in much the same way as we did for S[0] and S [1] . After this we peel of the first round and proceed to determine the other subkeys.
This attack is faster than an exhaustive key search for the 128-bit key version of RC6 with up to 12 rounds, and for the 192-bit and 256-bit versions of RC6 with up to 14 rounds. [33] . The latter two keys are used to decrypt the ciphertexts one round. In the updating of the probability-arrays, one only uses ciphertexts for which there are zero rotations in the last round. The number of texts needed is approximately 2 10 times that of 14 rounds, and the time complexity increases with a factor of about 2 54 . To rule out all false values of the keys, we estimate that the number of plaintexts needed increases by yet a factor of 2.
Note that in the above attacks the number of available texts is bounded by 2 118 , since we need to fix 10 bits of each plaintext. The probability distributions for each such fixed 10-bit value will be different, but their distance to the uniform distribution can be expected to be similar. As an extension of the above attacks consider the following. Run the attack with x texts for one fixed value of the 10 bits in the plaintexts. Record the χ 2 -value for each key in the attack, and rank the keys. Reset the arrays. Repeat the attack x texts for another fixed value of the 10 bits. Record again the χ 2 -value for each key in the attack, and rank the keys. Repeat this a number of times. If the χ 2 -values for the correctly guessed keys will be larger than for random values, one can expect that the correct key will be high in the rankings, and it can be detected after sufficiently many iterations. Thus this variant would make available all 2 128 texts. We conjecture that this attack is applicable to 15 rounds of RC6 with a complexity as given in the last entry of Table 10 .
We leave it as an open question whether the attack and its variants can be used to attack RC6 with 16 or more rounds.
Finally, note that the reported attacks are chosen plaintext attacks. However, it follows that the basic attack reported earlier can be easily transformed into a known plaintext attack with an increase in the needed texts of a factor of at most 2 10 , leaving the total time complexity unaltered.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an attack on RC6 which is based on a strong relationship between the effects of data dependent rotations in the round function and statistical input-output dependencies.
Estimates which are based on systematic experimental results show that versions of RC6 with up to 15 rounds can be distinguished from a random per-mutation. A class of weak keys has been identified for which this nonrandomness is estimated to persist up to 17 rounds. Finally, we have derived a method for key-recovery for RC6 with up to 15 rounds which is faster than exhautive key search. We do not know whether our analysis can be used to attack RC6 with 16 or more rounds.
We remark that similar attacks are applicable to reduced-round versions of RC5. However, it seems such attacks are not better than existing (differential) attacks on RC5 [3] .
